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The United States Constitution employs two basic methods
1
for proposing constitutional amendments. Under the congressional proposal method, two thirds of each house of
Congress can propose a constitutional amendment. Under the
convention method, the state legislatures can apply for a
national convention that would then decide whether to propose
a constitutional amendment. The amendments proposed under
either of these two methods are then subject to ratification by
the state legislatures or state conventions, as Congress
determines.
These amendment methods were designed to operate
together to ensure that no one entity could prevent the
enactment of an amendment. Thus, if Congress seeks an
amendment that the state legislatures oppose, Congress can
propose the amendment and task state conventions with the
ratification decision. Similarly, if the state legislatures seek an
amendment that Congress opposes, the state legislatures can
apply for a convention that could propose the amendment,

1. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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which would then be subject to ratification either by the states
legislatures or state conventions.
Unfortunately, one of these two amendment methods is
broken. The convention method simply does not work. Not only
has it never been used to enact an amendment, but no
2
convention has ever been called. This lack of use, moreover,
cannot be attributed to a lack of political interest in enacting
amendments that Congress opposes. In recent years, there has
been strong political support for at least three proposed
amendments that would reduce congressional power—a
Balanced Budget Amendment, a Line Item Veto Amendment,
and a Congressional Term Limits Amendment—but unsurprisingly, Congress has refused to propose any of these. Yet, the
convention method has not been employed either to enact these
3
amendments or even to call a convention. That the convention
method is broken suggests that the Constitution now operates in
a unbalanced way, allowing only amendments that promote
congressional power, but not permitting amendments that
4
constrain it.
The most important reason why the convention method
does not work is the fear of a runaway convention. To understand this fear, imagine that two thirds of the state legislatures
were to apply for a convention on a specific subject, such as
restraining the federal government’s power to pass unbalanced
budgets, and Congress were to call for a convention on that
subject. The problem, however, is that the convention might
choose to ignore this subject matter limitation and propose a
different amendment—perhaps an amendment to authorize a
constitutional right to same sex marriage or to prayer in the
public schools. And that amendment might then be ratified by
the three quarters of the states. A state legislator that sought a
balanced budget amendment might, then, end up instead with an
2. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 734 (1993).
3. An effort has been made in the last several decades to apply for a convention to
propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, with 32 of the requisite 34 states legislatures
having applied at some time for a convention. But the state legislatures have never been
willing to take the next step of satisfying the two thirds constitutional requirement for a
convention, even though concerns about federal deficits have been great at various times
in the last several decades. The fear of a runaway convention has simply been too great.
See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 161 (1988); Michael B. Rappaport,
Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment
Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1533 n.47 (2010).
4. See Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1526–55.
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amendment providing either a constitutional right to same sex
marriage or to prayer in the public schools—something that he
or she might strongly oppose. The fear of such a runaway
convention has led many to oppose use of the convention
5
method.
While the failure of the convention method represents a
significant constitutional defect, in this Article I argue that the
defect results from the failure to follow the Constitution’s
original meaning. I contend that the original meaning of the
Constitution allows for limited conventions—conventions that
are limited only to proposing amendments on specific subjects.
Therefore, if the state legislatures apply for a convention limited
solely to proposing an amendment that restrains the federal
government’s power to pass unbalanced budgets, the convention
would not be permitted to propose an amendment on other subjects. The Constitution therefore forbids runaway conventions.
To elaborate on my argument, I maintain that, once two
thirds of the states apply for the same limited convention,
Congress is obligated to call that limited convention. Moreover,
the convention is required to conform to the limits in Congress’s
call. If the convention were to violate the limitations in the call—
if it were to propose an amendment that was not within the
scope of its authority—then that proposal would be unconstitutional. It would not represent the type of proposal that is
allowed by the Constitution and could not be legally ratified by
the states. I also argue that the limitations on the convention can
be quite strict. The Constitution allows the state legislatures to
apply not merely for a convention limited to a specific subject
matter. It also allows the state legislatures to draft a specially
worded amendment and then to apply for a convention limited
to deciding only whether to propose that amendment.
Readers familiar with the literature on the convention
method of constitutional amendment may be surprised by my
conclusions. In the past, several leading constitutional scholars
have argued that the Constitution does not permit the states or
6
Congress to impose limits on a convention. And virtually no
constitutional scholar has argued that a convention limited to a
specifically worded amendment is constitutional. Yet, I argue
that these past scholars have been mistaken. In part, the
differences between my view and theirs turn on the fact that I
5. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 161; Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1533 n.47.
6. See infra Part III.
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seek to apply a rigorous original meaning analysis, whereas they
have either invoked their own normative commitments or
applied different or looser versions of originalism. But, in part,
the differences are due to what I believe are mistaken inferences
and interpretations of evidence. Finally, the differences may also
be due to the fact that my analysis provides what is, to my
knowledge, the first rigorous textual derivation of the right of
the states to apply for a limited convention.
Of course, showing that the Constitution’s original meaning
authorizes limited conventions will not solve the defect in the
convention method. To eliminate the possibility of a runaway
convention, it is necessary that other constitutional actors, such
as the Congress, the convention, and the courts, also conclude
that the Constitution authorizes limited conventions. Without
such agreement, these other constitutional actors might engage
in or support a runaway convention. While showing that the
original meaning authorizes limited conventions is therefore
insufficient to eliminating the defect in the convention method, it
is a first step in that direction. It is also important for assigning
responsibility for this defect. This defect is not, as some would
have it, the responsibility of the constitutional enactors who
decided to employ an illimitable convention. Rather, the defect
is the result of both nonoriginalists and originalists who have
misread or ignored the original meaning.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the Constitution’s two methods of proposing constitutional amendments:
the congressional proposal method and the convention method.
Part II then explains the two interpretations of the convention
method: the limited convention view, which reads the
Constitution as authorizing both limited and unlimited conventions, and the unlimited convention view, which interprets it
only to allow unlimited conventions.
Part III then undertakes the task of deriving the limited
convention view from the constitutional text. It argues, based on
evidence from contemporary dictionaries, from other parts of
the Constitution, from conventions existing at the time, and from
other evidence of word usage, that the original meaning of the
Constitution’s phrase a “Convention for proposing Amendments” includes both limited and unlimited conventions. It also
shows that the Constitution’s authorization of state legislatures
to apply for a “Convention for proposing Amendments” allows
them to apply for limited conventions. Part IV then explores
arguments based on structure and purpose, concluding that they
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also support the limited convention view. Finally, Part V
addresses three arguments against the limited convention view—
that a convention was historically understood as illimitable, that
the runaway Philadelphia Convention shows that the Framers
believed that conventions were not subject to limitations, and
that the debates at the Philadelphia Convention indicate that the
Framers would have opposed limited conventions. This part
rebuts each of these arguments, showing that none of them calls
the limited convention view into question.
I. ARTICLE V
A. THE CONSTITUTION’S AMENDMENT PROVISIONS
Article V of the Constitution describes in a single paragraph
the various methods for amending the Constitution. It provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
7
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article V thus establishes a two step process for enacting an
amendment: first an amendment is proposed and then it is
ratified. There are also two ways of completing each step. An
amendment can be proposed either by two thirds of each house
of Congress or by two thirds of the state legislatures applying for
Congress to call a convention that would draft an amendment.
Similarly, an amendment can be ratified by three quarters of the
states, either through their legislatures or through state
conventions. Finally, Article V is modular: either of the proposal
methods can be paired with either of the ratification methods.
Article V’s purpose in providing alternative amendment
methods is evident: to prevent a single government entity from
7. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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having a veto over the passage of an amendment. While
Congress is given the authority to propose amendments, the
convention method allows the nation to bypass Congress and
propose amendments that constrain Congress’s powers.
Similarly, while the state legislatures can ratify amendments,
they might choose to reject amendments that constrain their
powers. Therefore, the Constitution allows ratification by state
conventions, which have different interests than the state
8
legislatures.
This understanding of the congressional amendment process
is supported by various statements made at the time of the
founding. Thus, George Mason, in the Philadelphia Convention,
argued that “It would be improper to require the consent of the
Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and
9
refuse their consent on that very account.” Similarly, James
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43, Article V “equally enables
the general and the State governments to originate the
amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the
10
experience on one side, or on the other.” In the New York
legislature, Samuel Jones explained that the Framers “prescribed
a mode by which Congress might procure more [power], if in the
operation of the government it was found necessary; and they
prescribed for the states a mode of restraining the powers of the
[federal] government, if upon trial it should be found they had
11
given too much.” Finally, at the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention, in response to the claim that the introduction of
amendments “depended altogether on Congress,” James Iredell
replied “that it did not depend on the will of Congress; for the
legislatures of two thirds of the states were authorized to make
application for calling a convention for proposing amendments,
and on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call
12
such convention, so that they will have no option.”
8. Article VII of the Constitution was adopted in part for a similar reason. Article
VII, which provided that the Constitution would take effect when nine of the thirteen
states, acting through state conventions, ratified it, used state conventions rather than
state legislatures in part because it was believed that the state legislatures had interests
that would lead them to oppose the new Constitution.
9. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 104–05 (W.H. Norton ed. 1987).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, AT 315 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
11. See 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 2522 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].
12. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
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Although Article V thus purposefully provides four paths to
13
amending the Constitution, the nation has almost always relied
on only one of them: Congress proposes an amendment and the
state legislatures ratify it. One time, for the 21st Amendment,
Congress proposed the amendment but state conventions were
14
used to ratify it. The one method that has never been employed
15
is having a convention propose a constitutional amendment.
B. THE CONVENTION METHOD
The convention method works quite differently than the
congressional proposal method. Under the convention method,
the state legislatures must apply for a convention. When two
thirds of the states have applied, Congress must call a convention. The convention, then, must determine whether to propose
a constitutional amendment. If it does propose an amendment,
Congress must determine whether ratification should occur by
state legislatures or state conventions.
In part because the convention method has never been
used, there are various questions about the constitutional rules
that govern this amendment method, including questions as to
who selects the convention delegates and the content and origin
16
of the rules that govern the convention. But the most important
question about the convention method for our purposes is
whether the Constitution authorizes limited conventions.
An unlimited convention is a convention that has no limits
17
placed on it by the state legislatures. The convention can
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 178 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES].

13. For additional statements expressing similar concerns, see An Old Whig, 13
DOCUMENTARY HIST. 316, 377 (“We shall never find two thirds of a Congress voting or
proposing anything which shall derogate from their own authority and importance.”); A
Plebeian, An Address to the People of the State of New York, Apr. 17, 1788, reprinted in
20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 942, 944 (arguing that “those who enjoy these powers” are
unlikely “to surrender” them).
14. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 126.
15. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 734.
16. See Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention:
Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 696–97 (2011).
17. A convention that was limited by Congress would also be a limited convention.
But a convention limited by Congress alone, without a limitation sought in the prior
applications of the state legislatures, would be clearly unconstitutional. See infra notes
63–66 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on Congress’s powers). Therefore,
when I discuss limited conventions, I will mean a convention where the limitations are
initially contained in the state applications and only then placed in the call of the
convention by Congress.
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propose an amendment on any subject it desires, subject to
constitutional constraints. In contrast, a limited convention is a
convention that is limited as to scope by applications from the
state legislatures. One can distinguish between the two types of
limited conventions. First, one can imagine a convention limited
to a subject, such as to financial matters. While this convention is
allowed discretion to decide what amendments to propose in the
financial area, it is not allowed to propose amendments that are
non-financial. Second, one can imagine a convention that is
limited to a specifically worded amendment. In this situation, the
state legislatures would have specified a particular amendment
in their applications and the convention’s duties would be
limited to deciding whether or not to propose that amendment.
We can call these two types of limited conventions, respectively,
“a convention limited as to subject” and “a convention limited to
a specifically worded amendment.”
II. THE CONTENDING VIEWS: LIMITED AND
UNLIMITED CONVENTIONS
There are two basic views about whether the Constitution
allows limited conventions. One position holds that limited
conventions are constitutional. Under this limited convention
view, if the states apply for a limited convention, then Congress
is required to call for such a convention and the convention is
permitted to propose only amendments within the scope
authorized by the applications of the state legislatures. Any
proposals that the convention makes on other matters are illegal.
One can further divide this basic limited convention view based
on the type of limited convention. Thus, one might hold the
limited convention view only for conventions limited to a
18
subject. Or one might go further and also hold the limited
convention view as to conventions limited to a specifically
19
worded amendment. Under this latter view, if the states seek a
convention limited not merely to a particular subject but to a
18. See Philip B. Kurland, A Bill to Provide Procedures for Calling Constitutional
Conventions for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, on
Application of the Legislatures of Two-Thirds of the States, Pursuant to Article V of the
Constitution, 90th Cong. 233–34 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Hearings] (memorandum from
Philip Kurland to Senator Sam J. Ervin); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment
and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949, 953–57 (1968); Sam J. Ervin,
Jr., Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the
Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 884 (1968).
19. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention—The
Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985, 990–91 (1979).
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specifically worded amendment, the convention is limited to
deciding whether to propose that specific amendment.
The alternative position holds that the Constitution does
not recognize limited conventions. Under this unlimited
convention view, a convention can never be limited as to the
20
amendments it can propose. Thus, if the states apply for a
limited convention, Congress would not even be authorized to
call a convention, because there would be no applications for the
only constitutional type of convention—an unlimited conven21
tion.
This unlimited convention view has been held by many of
the leading scholars of constitutional law over the last 40 years,
including Bruce Ackerman, Charles Black, Walter Dellinger,
22
Gerald Gunther, and Michael Paulsen. Despite the illustrious
reputations of these scholars, I do not believe their arguments
are persuasive from an original meaning perspective. The
problem is in part that their methodology does not track that of
modern originalism, but it is also the nature of their arguments.
In the next two Parts, I argue in favor of the strongest
version of the limited convention view—that states may seek
either a convention limited to a subject or a convention limited
23
to a specially worded amendment. In making my argument, I
focus on the original public meaning of Article V. I leave aside,
for the most part, arguments based on alternative interpretive

20. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a
Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1972) [hereinafter Black 1972]; Walter E. Dellinger,
The Recurring Question of the “Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623,
1624 (1979); Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States
Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (1979); Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738 (“[T]here can
be no such thing as a ‘limited’ constitutional convention.”); Bruce Ackerman,
Unconstitutional Convention, The New Republic, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8.
21. Some advocates of the unlimited convention view take a flexible view about the
meaning of state applications. According to this approach, some state applications that
appear to be applying for a limited convention are reasonably interpreted as also
applying for an unlimited convention, if Congress concludes that a limited convention is
not legal. If two-thirds of the state legislatures made such an application, then this
approach would require that Congress call an unlimited convention. See Pauslen, supra
note 2, at 738.
22. See supra notes 2, 20.
23. It is worth noting that the name “limited convention view” is a bit misleading.
There is nothing under this view that requires that a limited convention be called. If the
state legislatures decide that the circumstances warrant it, they can apply for Congress to
call an unlimited convention. In this sense, one might call the limited convention view the
state legislative discretion view, since it allows the state legislatures to decide on the type
of convention. But I shall stick to the terminology of “the limited convention view” and
“the unlimited convention view” because of its greater transparency.
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theories, although I do rebut a few influential arguments based
24
on original intent.
While not all constitutional interpreters are originalists, this
paper nonetheless is of more general interest than it might at
first seem. First, many scholars who do not regard themselves as
originalists still believe the Constitution’s original meaning is
relevant to the Constitution’s proper interpretation, even if it is
not determinative. Second, original meaning analysis tends to be
most influential in areas where long standing precedents do not
exist. This is the case regarding the convention method.
III. THE LIMITED CONVENTION VIEW: TEXT
The limited convention view derives supports from several
types of evidence—evidence of text, historical usage, and
structure and purpose. It also gains power from weaknesses in
the unlimited convention view. This Part focuses on text and
historical usage.
The initial challenge is to show that the limited convention
view can be derived from the constitutional text. The text of
Article V provides that “The Congress . . . on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
25
Convention for proposing Amendments.” The limited convention view must derive three conclusions from the text: it must
show that two thirds of the state legislatures can apply for
Congress to call a limited convention, that Congress must then
call a limited convention, and that the convention must conform
to that call.
The unlimited convention view is obviously skeptical about
this possibility. In fact, that view claims to read the text as
straightforwardly precluding limited conventions. Under the
unlimited convention view, it is thought that the language “a
Convention for proposing Amendments” suggests a convention
26
that can propose whatever amendments it likes. Consequently,
the view maintains that there is no textual basis for inferring
power in the state legislatures or Congress to limit what the
convention may consider.
Despite these arguments, I maintain that, once one
examines the text, one can see that the elements of the limited
24. See infra Part V.C.
25. U.S. CONST. art. V.
26. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738.
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convention view can be derived from it and, in fact, that the text
represents a brief and elegant way of communicating these
elements. Advocates of the limited convention view have not
previously derived these conclusions from the text, but I
undertake that task here.
In particular, I argue that the three elements of the limited
convention view—that two thirds of the state legislatures can
apply for Congress to call a limited convention, that Congress
must then call a limited convention, and that the convention
must conform to that call—can be derived from the text in three
steps. First, “a Convention for proposing Amendments” is broad
enough to cover not merely unlimited conventions but also
limited conventions. Put differently, a limited convention is one
type of “Convention for proposing Amendments.” Second, if
Congress can call a limited convention, then the language
certainly suggests that the convention should conform to the
limitations of that call. Because the convention derives its
authority to meet from the call, it must respect the limitations in
that call as well. Third, the language allowing the states to apply
for Congress to call a convention also obligates Congress to call
a limited convention. When two thirds of the states submit
applications for an unlimited convention, that obligates Congress
to call that convention. Similarly, when two thirds of the states
submit applications for a limited convention, that also obligates
Congress to call that limited convention.
I shall discuss each of these three steps in turn. I begin with
the meaning of a “Convention for proposing Amendments.”
A. A CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS.
The Constitution provides that upon the application of two
thirds of the state legislature, the Congress shall call a
“Convention for proposing Amendments.” The question here is
what the Constitution means by the phrase a “Convention for
proposing Amendments” and in particular whether such a convention includes a limited convention. Here, I argue that the
evidence bearing on the original meaning of the phrase strongly
suggests that a limited convention is such a “Convention for
proposing Amendments.”
The unlimited convention view argues that the term
“propose” suggests that a convention for proposing amendments
is unlimited. But I show that the term “propose” did not imply
an unlimited power of the convention to endorse any constitu-
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tional provision of its choosing. First, I show, based on evidence
from contemporary dictionaries and other usages in the
Constitution, that the term merely meant the power to authorize
an amendment to be sent to the states. Second, I then focus on a
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, showing
that nothing about a convention suggests the power to consider
alternatives. Finally, I discuss the contrary arguments of Charles
Black, perhaps the leading scholar of the unlimited convention
view, arguing that they cannot be reconciled with the evidence of
the original meaning.
1. The Proposal Power as the Power to Offer for Adoption
The meaning of the phrase a “Convention for proposing
Amendments” is best understood as referring to a convention
that has the power to formally propose amendments that are
then eligible to be ratified by the states. Under the
Constitution’s two amendment methods—the congressional
proposal method and the convention method—the Constitution
provides for two essential steps. One entity formally proposes an
amendment. A second entity then formally decides whether to
ratify that amendment. The entity with the power to propose is
the only entity that can take the first essential step of proposing
the amendment. And only an amendment that has been formally
proposed can be sent to the states for the second essential step of
ratification. Thus, the power possessed by the proposing
convention is the power to approve an amendment that can then
be sent to the states for ratification.
This understanding of propose is supported by the ordinary
meaning of the term when the Constitution was enacted. The
first edition of Webster’s Dictionary, for example, has as its first
definition, “To offer for consideration, discussion, acceptance or
27
adoption; as, to propose a bill or resolve to a legislative body.”
The meaning that I employ accords with this definition: to offer
for adoption. The proposing convention has the formal power to
offer an amendment for adoption by the ratifiers. The ratifers,
then, have the power to adopt the amendment.

27. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(New York, S. Converse 1828). Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 defines “propose” as “[t]o
offer to the consideration” and as a “[s]cheme or design propounded to consideration or
acceptance.” 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(London, W. Strahan 1755).
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This meaning of propose is also followed in other parts of
the Constitution. Article V provides that “The Congress,
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
28
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . .” This
meaning of propose is exactly the same as that used for the
proposing convention. If two thirds of both houses approve an
amendment, it is formally proposed and can then be sent to the
states for ratification.
Similarly, the Constitution provides in Article I, section 7,
clause 1, that “All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
29
concur with Amendments as on other Bills.” The term
“propose” here once again involves the formal power to offer for
adoption. Suppose the Senate receives a revenue bill from the
House and then decides to amend it. The Senate then will pass
the amended revenue bill and send it back to the house. This
revenue bill is then formally proposed by the Senate. If the
House passes the exact revenue bill proposed by the Senate,
then it is enacted by the Congress and sent to the President.
Thus, the Senate’s power to propose revenue bills is similar to
the powers of Congress and the convention to propose
amendments. In these cases, the power is to offer a specific
measure for adoption by another body.
This understanding of the proposing convention also makes
perfect sense if we understand the historical context when the
Constitution was written. As I show below in my review of the
30
history of conventions, when the Constitution was enacted
many different types of conventions existed. Some conventions
were enacting conventions—they had the power to draft and
enact a constitution or constitutional provision on their own.
Other conventions were ratifying conventions, ratifying a
constitution or constitutional provision drafted by another
entity. Still other conventions were proposing conventions that
recommended provisions that another entity had to enact. Given
the variety of conventions, it was important for the Constitution
to clearly indicate the type of conventions that were being
employed. The language of Article V does that well. Thus, the
constitutional language clearly speaks of state conventions that
only ratify amendments. And, most importantly for our

28. U.S. CONST. art. V.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
30. See infra Part V.A.
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purposes, the language, “a convention for proposing amendments,” clearly indicates that the proposing convention only has
31
the power to propose and cannot enact anything on its own.
Thus, one need not reach for other possible meanings of a
proposing convention (such as the power to exercise discretion
over what amendments to propose) to find a purpose for the
language. Its primary purpose is to clarify that the convention
has only the power to offer an amendment for adoption by the
states.
To move now to the key issue, this meaning of “propose”
indicates that a convention for proposing amendments can be
either a limited or unlimited convention. Certainly, an unlimited
convention would be a convention for proposing amendments.
Such a convention could decide on what amendment to pass and
that amendment would be formally proposed. It could then be
sent to the states for ratification.
But both types of limited conventions would also be
conventions for proposing amendments. Even in the case of a
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, the
convention would make the decision whether to propose that
amendment. If it passes that amendment, then the amendment is
formally proposed and can be sent to the states for ratification. If
the convention does not pass the amendment, then it is not
proposed and cannot can be sent to the states for ratification.
The convention limited to a specifically worded amendment thus
has the power to offer an amendment for adoption by the
ratifiers and is therefore a proposing convention.
Finally, this definition of a proposing convention is also
supported by the fact that limited conventions were well known
to the Constitution’s enactors. Perhaps, the most obvious limited
proposing convention was the Philadelphia Convention itself.
The Congress under the Articles had called for the Philadelphia
Convention “for the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation” and “when agreed to in Congress,
and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation
31. Not only is it forbidden from enacting constitutional amendments, it also cannot
enact legislation, as some conventions of various kinds had done or sought to do. See
JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND LEGISLATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; ITS
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING §§ 123–38 (Chicago, E.B. Meyers 2d
ed. 1869) (discussing the general legislative powers of individual state conventions at the
time of the framing).
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of the Union.” This call was limited, because it was intended for
the convention to propose revisions that would employ the
amendment procedure in the Articles, a procedure which
33
required approval by the Congress and the state legislatures.
The Annapolis Convention, which had preceded the
Philadelphia Convention, was also a limited convention. The call
for the Annapolis Convention, circulated by Virginia, had stated
that the convention would propose measures relating to
34
commerce.
State constitutions also appear to have authorized limited
conventions. In particular, the Georgia Constitution of 1777
provided:
No alteration shall be made in this constitution without
petitions from a majority of the counties, and the petitions
from each county to be signed by a majority of voters in each
county within this State; at which time the assembly shall
order a convention to be called for that purpose, specifying
the alterations to be made, according to the petitions
preferred to the assembly by the majority of the counties as
35
aforesaid.
36

Although there are other possible interpretations, the most
obvious and, in my view, the best interpretation of this provision
is that it limits conventions to deciding whether to adopt the
37
alterations recommended by the petitioning counties. After all,
the provision states that the “assembly shall order a convention
to be called . . . specifying the alterations to be made according to
the petitions.” Other state constitutions also employed
conventions limited to ratifying the decisions proposed by
32. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 480 (letter from the Hon. Robert Yates
and the Hon. John Lansing).
33. The Philadelphia Convention, however, became a runaway convention when it
proposed a Constitution that adopted a different ratification procedure. For discussion of
why this does not count against the limited convention view, see infra Part V.B.
34. Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia 153 (Jan.
21, 1786); CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 22–23.
35. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII.
36. It might be argued that the provision merely required the convention to receive
the proposed alterations from the majority of the counties, but allowed the convention to
ignore them and enact others. But this seems to conflict with the language of the provision, which states that the “assembly shall order a convention to be called . . . specifying
the alterations to be made according to the petitions.” The language does not say,
“specifying some of the alterations that should be considered by the convention.”
37. Interestingly, this provision of the Georgia Constitution was never used. On its
own authority, the Georgia legislature called a convention to draft a new constitution in
1788. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 15. For a discussion of how this authority might be
understood, see infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text.
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38

others. Finally, there were also numerous limited interstate
conventions held in the period between Independence and the
39
Constitution. Although these conventions were directed
towards interstate relations such as trade and the war rather than
constitutions, they were nonetheless referred to as conventions
40
and had much in common with the Philadelphia Convention.
Finally, if the constitutional enactors allowed limited
conventions, one might wonder why they did not indicate more
specifically that a convention could be limited. But this question
is easily answered. The constitutional language needed to be
broad enough to extend to applications not merely for limited
conventions but also for unlimited ones. After all, the Framers
would certainly have desired that unlimited conventions be
permitted, since there is no reason to believe that the states
always would have been able to agree on a subject or
amendment, especially given the limited deliberation among
states in a world with poor communication technology. But the
fact that the states might not always be able to agree on a subject
or amendment does not mean that they never could have. Thus,
to permit state legislative requests both for limited and unlimited
conventions, the Constitution speaks in neutral terms of a
convention for proposing amendments and of a process whereby
the states apply for, and Congress calls, such a convention.
Given the Constitution’s brevity, the language here of a
“Convention for proposing Amendments” makes sense as a
simple and straightforward way of expressing a more
complicated idea.
If, then, the phrase a “Convention for proposing
Amendments” has a general meaning that includes any type of
convention that can propose an amendment, one should
understand that phrase as the equivalent of what might be
communicated in longer and more specific language. The
language here should be understood as shorthand for a provision
stating that “The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention” either for proposing amendments of its own

38. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; VT. CONST. of 1786, § XL.
39. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 17–19; Natelson, supra note 16, at 717–19
(discussing these conventions).
40. These conventions were similar to the Philadelphia Convention most
importantly in that they were conventions of multiple states that were tasked with
proposing new arrangements that would affect those states and their proposals would
only go into effect if approved by those states.
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choosing, for proposing amendments regarding a subject, or for
41
proposing a specific amendment.
2. A Convention Limited to a Specifically Worded
Amendment
Although I have argued in favor of the limited convention
view generally, the issue of conventions limited to a specifically
worded amendment requires additional attention, since such
conventions are more controversial. Several commentators have
argued in favor of the constitutionality of conventions limited to
a subject, but against the constitutionality of conventions limited
42
to a specifically worded amendment.
The principal argument used against the constitutionality of
conventions limited to a specifically worded amendment is that
they would deprive the convention of its opportunity to exercise
discretion over what specific amendment to pass. This limitation
on the convention’s discretion is said to be inconsistent with it
43
being a convention for proposing amendments. It is also argued
that limiting the convention to a specifically worded amendment
44
would turn it into a ratification convention.
Although these arguments have been persuasive to some
advocates of the limited convention view, they have little basis in
the Constitution’s original meaning. There is nothing in the
meaning of the constitutional terms “convention’ or “a convention for proposing amendments” that requires a convention to
have a choice between different specific amendments. Put
differently, a convention can be limited as to whether or not to
propose a specific amendment and still be a convention.
It is true that certain conventions at the time of the
Constitution were given significant discretion as to what
41. That Article V speaks of a convention for proposing “Amendments” rather
than “an Amendment” surely does not affect the correctness of this interpretation. A
limited convention could be restricted to two (or more) subjects or two (or more) specific
amendments. Moreover, the enactors needed to use language broad enough to cover
conventions that proposed either one or multiple amendments, and the plural was more
suited to that task. A convention for proposing amendments would be permitted to
propose a single amendment; a convention for proposing an amendment might not be
allowed to propose multiple amendments.
42. See, e.g., 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 233–34; Bonfield, supra note 18, at
953–57; Ervin, supra note 18, at 884; Natelson, supra note 16, at 732. The main
commentator I am aware of who endorses conventions limited to a specific subject is
William Van Alstyne. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 990–91; Gunther, supra note 20,
at 6 n.15 (noting Van Alstyne’s view).
43. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 18, at 953–54.
44. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 955.
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constitutional provisions to propose or enact. But the question is
not whether some conventions had discretion. Rather, it is
whether all conventions must have discretion and, most
importantly, whether a proposing convention must have
discretion. The answer to these questions is no.
It is clear from the Constitution itself that conventions need
not possess such discretion. The Constitution employs two type
of conventions that were given no discretion: state conventions
that may be employed to ratify amendments and the original
state conventions called to ratify the original Constitution.
Clearly, ratification conventions do not have discretion over
what measures to enact. They are required to make a single yesor-no decision. Of course, that does not make them unimportant,
since they decide whether a proposed amendment will be
enacted.
If conventions generally do not necessarily need to confer
discretion, then what about proposing conventions? Is there
something about the proposing power that requires such
conventions to possess discretion? The commentators discussed
above assume that the activity of proposing a constitutional
amendment requires that conventions have discretion. After all,
they might ask, what is it that a proposing convention does other
than deciding what amendment to propose?
But this argument is mistaken. Although the proposing
convention contemplated by Article V will sometimes have
discretion (such as when the states apply for an unlimited
convention or a convention limited to a subject), there is nothing
about the concept of a proposing convention in Article V that
requires discretion. As we have seen, the Constitution’s use of the
phrase a “Convention for proposing Amendments” refers
merely to a convention that has the authority to offer an amendment for adoption by the states through ratification. There is
nothing in the phrase that requires discretion.
The other argument against the constitutionality of a
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment—that it
is the equivalent of a ratification convention—is also not
persuasive. It is true that such a limited proposing convention
will be restricted to an up-or-down vote on an amendment, just
like a ratification convention is. But that the two conventions
share a common attribute does not mean they are identical for
constitutional purposes. The question is whether a convention
limited to a specifically worded amendment meets the

!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

6/7/2012 3:19 PM

72

[Vol. 81:53

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

constitutional definition of a proposing or a ratification convention. As I have been arguing, such a convention meets the
definition of a proposing convention, because it has the power to
offer an amendment for adoption by the states. By contrast, it
does not meet the definition of a ratification convention, which
is a convention that has the authority to ratify or enact an
amendment proposed by another body.
3. Charles Black’s Arguments for the Unlimited
Convention View
Given these strong arguments for interpreting a proposing
convention to allow for limited conventions, what then are the
arguments against this conclusion? The principal textual and
structural arguments have been made by Charles Black. Black
argues that a “Convention for proposing Amendments” means a
“a convention for proposing such amendments as to that
45
convention seem suitable for being proposed.” I discuss Black’s
principal textual and structural arguments in turn.
a. Text
Black’s textual argument derives from the meaning of
Congress’s power to propose amendments in Article V. Article
V authorizes “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
46
Houses shall deem it necessary, [to] propose Amendments.”
Black claims that this power is essentially unlimited, entailing
“choice among the whole range of alternatives, as to substance
47
and wording.” He then claims that “[i]t is very doubtful
whether the same word two lines later [referring to “a
convention for proposing amendments”] . . . ought to be taken to
48
denote a mechanical take-it-or-leave-it process.” Thus, Black’s
argues that “a convention for proposing amendments” allows the
convention essentially unlimited authority to propose
amendments because Congress enjoys that same authority under
49
its authority to propose amendments.
Black’s argument about the meaning of propose, however,
cannot bear the weight that he places on it. It is true that
45. Black 1972, supra note 20, at 196.
46. U.S. CONST. art. V.
47. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened
Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 962 (1963) [hereinafter Black 1963].
48. Id.
49. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amendment by National Constitutional Convention: A
Letter to a Senator, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 626, 630 (1979) [hereinafter Black 1979].
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Congress has great discretion to decide what amendments to
propose, but that does not indicate that this discretion derives
from the power to propose. There is an obvious alternative
explanation for this result. Article V gives to Congress the power
to propose amendments without involving any other entity.
Thus, the Constitution does not authorize any significant limits
on Congress’s proposing power. By contrast, the proposing
convention is given the power to propose amendments only if
the states apply for a convention and Congress calls it. If one
assumes, as I argue in the next section, that the states can apply
for a limited convention, then that explains why the Congress
has great discretion to propose what amendments it likes and the
proposing convention might be limited as to what it can propose:
the Constitution gives the state legislatures the power to limit
the scope of the convention’s proposing power, but it does not
give anyone the power to limit Congress’s proposing power.
Although Congress’s proposing power can easily be
explained by the limited convention view, Black’s unlimited
convention view has great difficulty with the evidence of the
original meaning that I have supplied. Black’s view cannot
account for the ordinary meaning of “propose” at the time of the
Constitution, which did not indicate that the power was
unlimited. He also has a hard time accounting for the limited
proposing conventions that were known to the Framers.
Moreover, Black’s interpretation of a “Convention for
proposing Amendments” does not even appear consistent with
the remainder of Article V. A few lines later in Article V, it
provides that after an amendment is proposed, the amendment
shall be a valid part of the Constitution when ratified by three
quarters of the state legislatures or state conventions, “as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
50
Congress.” This use of “propose” is clearly inconsistent with an
unlimited discretion to make choices. Rather, Congress is limited
to a choice between two alternatives: ratification by state
legislatures or state conventions. Clearly, the constitutional
authors did not understand the term “propose” to imply
51
unlimited discretion.
50. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
51. It should be noted that this usage of “propose” may not be the same one that is
employed in the earlier part of Article V (where “propose” meant “the power to offer
for adoption”). This usage of “propose” allows Congress to make an authoritative choice
as to which ratification method to use, whereas the usage of “propose” employed earlier
in Article V allows Congress and the convention merely to approve an amendment for
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But there is even clearer evidence that Black’s
understanding of propose is mistaken. In the next section, I
discuss a prior version of Article V offered by James Madison.
That version provided that “Congress . . . on the application of
two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States shall propose
52
amendments to this Constitution.” As I will show, it is plain
that, if two thirds of the state legislatures applied for a
specifically worded amendment, Congress was required to
propose that amendment. Thus, the provision shows clearly that
the word “propose” did not mean an unlimited or discretionary
power to draft a provision. Instead, its meaning cohered
perfectly with the ordinary language meaning I have supplied
53
here: to offer a provision or matter for adoption.

someone else to ratify. Here, Congress is not offering for adoption, but instead making a
decision.
It is not clear why the Philadelphia Convention used this language differently. There
are two possibilities. First, the drafters might have been focused on the question whether
the amendment would be ratified, which was uncertain, rather than on the ratification
method, which Congress could decide. One might think of this as a case of the drafters
using language imprecisely. Yet, it is also possible to argue that the drafters were not
being sloppy. Instead, one might say that a mode of ratification was successful only if the
ratification actually occurred. In that event, the proposed mode of ratification was
adopted only if the ratification was successful. Second, it is possible that the Framers
were using another sense of “propose,” which meant “to lay schemes.” See WEBSTER,
supra note 27 (offering one definition of “propose” as “to lay schemes”). But this usage
would be a bit awkward. A scheme or intent is not something that is necessarily realized
in the real world; it is not an authorized choice. But even if this usage of “propose” is
being employed here, it may still have relevance for understanding the earlier usage in
Article V. After all, a scheme or plan might be deemed, based on the analysis employed
by Black, to be unlimited. Normally, one has discretion to devise any scheme. That
Congress is limited to choosing between two alternatives suggests that “propose” in this
related sense can be limited. Thus, neither of the senses of “propose” would necessarily
involve unlimited choice, even though often one has discretion as to what matters to
propose.
52. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 602 (Max Farrand
ed. 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
53. Charles Black also offers another textual argument. He imagines that a state
legislature submits an application that simply requests “that Congress call a convention
for proposing amendments—the exact language of Article V.” Black, 1979, supra note
49, at 629–31. He then argues that this application is for an unlimited convention and
concludes that the constitutional language therefore appears to refer only to such a
convention. But Black’s argument does not show that the constitutional language is
referring only to an unlimited convention. It is true that a state legislature’s application
for “a convention for proposing amendments” is properly interpreted as applying for an
unlimited convention. But that is not because the phrase has only that meaning. Rather,
because the state legislature has not specified a subject for the convention, it is
reasonably interpreted as seeking an unlimited convention. But if the state legislature
had applied for a convention for proposing amendments regarding debt limitation, that
would have been a perfectly grammatical and sensible way of seeking a limited
convention. Thus, Black’s argument, when properly pursued, leads to the conclusion that
a convention for proposing amendments can be either a limited or unlimited convention.
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Black’s mistake here appears to involve confusing an
accidental attribute of the power to propose with an essential
attribute. It is true that the act of proposing often involves
significant discretion, but that is because in most circumstances
proposals are not limited by rules. That the power to propose
often includes such discretion does not mean that it always
54
does.
b. Structure and Relation
In addition to his textual argument, Black also makes an
argument based on structure and relation. Black contends that if
the proposing convention is unlimited, a national institution will
55
be proposing the constitutional amendment. That national
insitution can treat a “national problem . . . as a problem, with a
wide range of possible solutions and an opportunity to raise and
56
discuss them all . . . .” In this respect, an unlimited convention
would be similar to the congressional proposal method, which
allows another national institution the opportunity to propose a
solution to a national problem. By contrast, if the convention
were a limited convention—especially if it were a convention
limited to a specifically worded amendment—then the proposed
solution to the national problem would have originated with the
state legislatures. Black contends that the unlimited convention
view should be preferred because it allows a nationally
formulated solution and because it accords with the con57
gressional proposal method.
It is certainly true that limited conventions allow a national
institution—the convention—less power to formulate a solution
than do unlimited conventions. But that does not suggest that
limited conventions were not intended by the constitutional
enactors for two reasons. First, while the constitutional enactors
would certainly not have wanted the state legislatures to be able
54. To take an example from modern language, which appears to follow the 18th
century usage, suppose that a House Committee Chair is deciding on what legislation to
propose. Under the rules of the Committee, he has the power to propose legislation for
the committee that a majority of the committee has affirmed. Suppose further that the
committee has affirmed bills A and B. Now, if the Chair were to ask his staff whether he
should propose A or B, no one would suggest that he is using language incorrectly, even
though his choice was limited. Moreover, if he announced to the House, that under the
committee rules, he was proposing for the committee bill A, once again, no one would
suggest he was misusing the language. The power to propose often includes significant
discretion, but it is not required by the language.
55. See Black 1963, supra note 47, at 963; Black 1979, supra note 49, at 630.
56. See Black 1963, supra note 47, at 963.
57. Id.; Black 1979, supra note 49, at 630.
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to amend the Constitution without being checked by a national
entity, neither type of limited convention does that. Even if the
state legislatures apply for a convention limited to a specifically
worded amendment, the national convention would have the
power to reject that amendment. Thus, a national entity could
58
block an excessively parochial amendment.
Second, there is no reason to assume that the constitutional
enactors would have always preferred a nationally developed
solution. They already had such an arrangement from the
congressional proposal method. Moreover, the state legislatures
would only apply for a limited convention if there were wide
agreement, from two thirds of the state legislatures, that a
particular solution was required. If the state legislatures could
reach such an agreement, it is not clear why it would be
necessary to have a national institution formulate a proposal.
Indeed, if the state legislatures could agree on a solution,
then the convention method would be very much like a mirror
image of the arrangement under the congressional proposal
method. Under the congressional proposal method, the national
government formulates an amendment and the states decide
whether to adopt it. Here, the state legislatures formulate an
amendment and the national convention decides whether to
approve that amendment (with the states, of course, ratifying it
as well).
Although Black assumes that the Framers would have
desired that both amendment methods employ a national
institution to formulate the amendment, one can just as strongly
argue that they would have a preferred a more pluralistic system.
Just as the Framers enacted two amendment methods—one
relying on Congress, the other not—so they might have wanted
the power to formulate an amendment to be placed at the
national level under one method and at the state level (to the
extent feasible) under the other method. This might be more in
accord with the constitutional structure as well as being more
desirable.

58. Moreover, even if the national convention did somehow approve a parochial
amendment, the Congress, a national entity, could still act against it. It could require that
the amendment be ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures, and
therefore ensure that another body that was independent of the state legislatures would
make the ratification decision.
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B. THE APPLICATIONS OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES FOR
A CONVENTION
This brings us to the second basic question. If a convention
for proposing amendments can include a limited convention, can
the states apply for one? There are two issues here. First, does
the Constitution allow the state legislatures to apply for a limited
convention? Second, if the Constitution does allow the state
legislatures to make such an application, does it also require
Congress to follow that application and call a limited
convention?
1. State Legislative Application for a Limited Convention
I have argued that a “Convention for proposing Amendments” is a phrase that covers both limited and unlimited
conventions. The question now is whether the states have the
power to apply for a limited convention. Since the Constitution
authorizes two thirds of the state legislatures to apply for a
convention for proposing amendments, and a limited convention
is one such convention for proposing amendments, the only way
that the states would lack the power to apply for a limited
convention is if there is something in Article V that would limit
their power. But, to the contrary, the language of Article V
strongly suggests that the states have this power.
First, the ordinary meaning of the term “application”
supports this understanding. At the time of the Constitution, an
application was a request made for something, as a request or
59
solicitation to a court. This term, then, did not contain any
limitation in it that would suggest that an application for a
convention could only be of a certain kind. Instead, an
application involved a request by the applicant and presumably
the applicant would decide what he wanted to request in the
application. Of course, this is not to say that the applicant could
apply for something he was not entitled to apply for. For
example, the states could not apply for a convention that would
enact constitutional amendments on its own authority. But since
a limited convention is one type of a convention for proposing
amendments, the state legislatures are entitled to apply for such
limited conventions. Thus, the ordinary meaning of application
suggests that the state legislatures can apply for limited
conventions.
59. WEBSTER, supra note 27 (“The act of making request or soliciting; as, he made
application to a court of chancery”) (emphasis in original); JOHNSON, supra note 27.
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Second, this understanding of application also appears to be
supported by the only other use of “application” in the
Constitution. The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, which
is the constitutional neighbor of Article V, provides: “The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
60
domestic Violence.”
The Clause thus requires the federal government to
guarantee each state a republican form of government and to
protect each state against invasion. But the federal government
is only allowed to protect the states against domestic violence on
the application of the legislature (or the executive when the
legislature cannot be convened). The evident purpose of this
provision reflects two concerns: It allows the states to receive the
support of the federal government to protect against domestic
violence, but it prevents the federal government from acting
without a prior request of the state. It appears that the
constitutional enactors believed that domestic violence might
give the federal government an excuse to intervene in a state and
to act against a group that the federal government disliked.
Despite the Clause’s clear purpose, a question might arise
about how the term “application” should be interpreted. There
are two possible meanings, corresponding to the two possible
meanings of “application” in Article V. On the one hand, a state
legislature might have the power make an application for
“limited” protection against domestic violence. Alternatively, a
state legislature might possess only the power to make an
application for protection generally. Suppose, for example, that
there is domestic violence in the eastern part of Virginia
concerning a tax revolt by debtors. The Virginia Legislature
makes an application to the federal government for protection
against the tax revolt in its two most eastern counties. Then,
while the federal government is subduing the revolt, there is a
violent dispute between farmers and ranchers in the western part
of the state. The Virginia legislature, however, believes it can
address the matter and does not ask for federal assistance. But
the federal government believes that Virginia is in danger and
seeks to protect them anyway.

60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

LIMITED CONVENTION

6/7/2012 3:19 PM

79

Could Virginia apply for limited protection that is restricted
to the tax revolt in the eastern counties? Or is Virginia allowed
only to apply for protection generally that would allow the
federal government to protect it against the western dispute,
despite the wishes of the Virginia state legislature? There is a
strong case that Virginia can apply for limited protection. The
point of the Clause is to give the state the discretion whether or
not to seek protection. If the state seeks protection for the
eastern uprising, but not the western one, it furthers the
underlying purpose to allow the application to apply only to the
eastern one. It allows the state to weigh the dangers of federal
intervention versus the state uprising, as to each uprising.
Moreover, allowing the federal government to act against
another uprising without state approval might give it the ability,
once federal troops are in the state, to act against political
opponents of the federal government. Finally, if the federal
government can act without state approval once an application
for protection has been made, then this may discourage a state
61
from seeking protection, even though it needs the protection.
Based on this strong evidence from the ordinary meaning of
“application” as well as from its use in the Guaranty Clause, I
conclude that the state legislatures have the power to apply for
62
limited conventions.

61. It might be questioned whether my interpretation of the Guarantee Clause has
implications for the meaning of Article V, because my interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause relies on the purposes underlying that Clause. Since the purposes underlying the
Guarantee Clause might have been different (for reasons unrelated to the meaning of
Article V), it might seem that my purpose-based interpretation of the Guarantee Clause
does not provide independent support for the limited convention view of Article V.
This argument, however, is mistaken. First. the Gaurantee Clause interpretation
helps to confirm that my understanding of the ordinary meaning of “apply,” as revealed
by the dictionary, is correct. If the Guarantee Clause had the alternative meaning,
allowing applications only for protection generally, then one might question whether my
reading of the dictionary meaning of “apply” was really correct. It would be odd for the
Guarantee Clause to have used the word “apply” if the ordinary meaning of that term
suggested a meaning contrary to the purposes of the Clause. Second, the Guarantee
Clause supports the limited convention view of “apply” because there is a rule of
construction that presumes words used in the same document have the same meaning. If
“apply” in the Guarantee Clause had the alternative meaning, then that would have
counted against the limited convention view of “apply.”
62. One last piece of evidence in favor of this understanding of application comes
from an earlier version of Article V offered by James Madison at the Philadelphia
Convention, which I discuss in the next section. The meaning of application in this
version supports the view that states can choose for what type of convention they seek to
apply.
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2. Congress’s Obligation to Call a Limited Convention
Because the state legislatures may apply for a limited
convention, this now leads us to the second issue—whether the
Constitution requires Congress to follow the state legislatures’
applications and call a limited convention. Once again, the
Constitution’s original meaning supports the limited convention
view.
First, the constitutional language allowing the states to
apply for Congress to call a convention obligates Congress to call
a convention. Putting the question of a limited convention to the
side, assume that two thirds of the state legislatures call for an
unlimited convention. It is widely accepted that Congress is
obligated to call such a convention. As Gerald Gunther put it,
this is one of the few issues upon which there is widespread
63
agreement. The language of Article V strongly supports this
result. It provides that “The Congress . . . on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states . . . shall call a
64
convention.” The “shall” indicates that Congress is obligated to
call the convention when the requisite number of applications
have been submitted. Moreover, this textual analysis is
supported by purposive considerations. One of the main
purposes of the convention method is to establish an amendment
process that does not require Congress’s approval. If Congress
can refuse to call a convention, that allows Congress to block
amendments. Finally, several statements made when the
Constitution was enacted confirm that Congress was understood
65
as being obliged to call a convention.

63. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 5.
64. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
65. See A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 1788, reprinted in 18
DOCUMENTARY HIST. 277, 283 (statement of Tench Coxe) (“It is provided in the clearest
words, that Congress shall be obliged to call a convention on the application of two thirds
of the legislatures . . . .”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 177 (statement of James
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention) (arguing that when two thirds of the
legislatures of the different states apply for a convention, “Congress are under the
necessity of convening” a convention) (emphasis added); id. at 178 (statement of James
Iredell at the North Carolina Ratifying convention) (arguing that the introduction of
amendments “did not depend on the will of Congress; for that the legislatures of two
thirds of the states were authorized to make application for calling a convention for
proposing amendments, and on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call
such convention, so that they will have no option”); A Pennsylvanian to the New York
Convention, PA. GAZETTE, June 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 1139,
1142–43 (statement of Tench Coxe) (“If two thirds of those legislatures require it,
Congress must call a general convention, even though they dislike the proposed
amendments . . . .”).
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But if Congress is obligated to call an unlimited convention
when the states apply for one, and if the states are authorized to
apply for a limited convention, this strongly suggests that
Congress is obligated to call a limited convention when the states
apply for one. After all, the same constitutional language that
obligates Congress to call an unlimited convention would apply
66
to the states’ applications for a limited convention. Moreover, if
the Constitution authorizes both limited and unlimited conventions, there is no reason to allow Congress to block
applications for limited conventions, but not unlimited ones.
C.

THE OBLIGATION OF THE CONVENTION TO FOLLOW THE
LIMITS SET BY THE STATES AND CONGRESS
This brings us to the final basic question. If Congress calls a
limited convention, is the convention required to conform to the
limitations in that call? Once again, the answer is yes.
First, the convention derives its authority from Congress’s
call and therefore is subject to the limitations in that call.
Without that call, the convention—at least the one authorized by
Article V—could not be lawfully brought into existence. If a
convention were to try to form without a call, it would clearly be
unconstitutional. It is the call that allows the convention to form.
Thus, if the authority for the convention to form itself limits the
power of the convention, the only convention that can form
would be subject to those limits. The convention would have no
more authority to go beyond those limits than a convention
67
would have to form on its own without a call.
Second, that the Constitution recognizes limited conventions suggests that a limited convention called by the

66. Another way to support the point in the text is to note that the Constitution
does not allow Congress to call a limited convention when the states call for an unlimited
one. But if that is true, then the Constitution should not allow Congress to call an
unlimited convention when a limited convention is called.
67. The interpretations put forth in this article also gain support from the two main
interpretive methods employed in the early years of the Constitution—the methods of
the Democractic Republicans and the Federalists. Despite their significant differences,
the interpretive methods of both of these groups support the positions that I defend in
this Article. Thomas Jefferson, for the Democratic Republicans, argued that the
Constitution was a compact between the states and should be interpreted in favor of the
parties to the compact. In this case, this interpretive principle supports allowing the state
legislatures to apply for a limited convention. Chief Justice John Marshall, for the
Federalists, contended that words in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning and that no preference should be given to the states. Once again, this
interpretive principle supports allowing the state legislatures to apply for a limited
convention, because the ordinary language of the constitutional text favors this result.
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Congress should be followed. It would be odd for the
Constitution to authorize a limited convention and then allow
the convention itself to ignore the limitations. For example, the
Constitution says that each legislative house shall determine its
68
rules of proceedings. No one would interpret that clause to
mean that, while a house can determine those rules, those rules
cannot be made binding on the individual members of the house.
Similarly, one would not interpret Article V to authorize limited
conventions, but then to allow the convention to ignore the call.
Instead, if the Framers intended to allow the convention to
ignore the limitations in the call, it is much more likely that they
would not have authorized limited conventions, but instead
authorized two thirds of the state legislatures merely to
69
recommend measures to the convention.
IV. EVIDENCE FROM EARLY INTERPRETATIONS
The textual arguments presented above derive additional
support from interpretations made during the framing and
ratification period. It is true that there are few situations where
people made statements that have clear implications for whether
the Constitution allows limited conventions. But these few
situations that have been uncovered provide support for the
limited convention view, and in one instance, the support is quite
powerful.
The most important evidence comes from the Philadelphia
Convention’s discussion of the version of Article V that
preceded the final version. This evidence, which is of word
meaning rather than intent, strongly suggests that the words
“propose” and “apply” had the meanings employed by the
limited convention view. There is other evidence as well. Both a
statement made during the ratification period by a prominent
Federalist and an application for a convention provide some
support for the limited convention view.
While this Part discusses evidence in favor of the limited
convention view, Part VI attempts to show that both the
discussions and actions of the Philadelphia Convention, that
others have argued support an unlimited convention, do not
actually do so.

68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
69. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the President “shall . . . recommend to [Congress]
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient”).
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A. INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIOR VERSION OF ARTICLE V
Initially, the Convention considered the amendment provision contained in the Virginia Plan, which stated “that provision
ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union
whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the
70
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.” A
modified version of this provision was submitted to the
Committee on Detail, which reported a clause stating, “On the
application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the
Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of
71
the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.”
This clause, however, was controversial, with objections being
raised from a variety of perspectives. Elbridge Gerry criticized it
on the ground that it appeared to permit a convention to amend
the constitution without any further ratification procedure.
Alexander Hamilton opposed it also because it allowed only the
state legislatures, not the national legislature, to call for a
72
convention.
At this point, James Madison proposed a replacement for
the Committee on Detail’s provision. Initially, the replacement
met with favor, being approved by a vote of nine states for, one
against, and one divided. After being edited for stylistic
purposes, Madison’s provision stated:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the
Legislatures of the several States shall propose amendments
to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been
ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
the Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be
made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the 1 &
73
4 clauses in the 9. Section of article 1.

This provision closely resembles the final Article V language. It
was largely the penultimate version of the article, and was
changed mainly to employ a convention rather than Congress to
draft amendments when the two thirds of the states had applied.

70.
71.
72.
73.

1 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 22.
2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 159.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 559.
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Let us begin by exploring the meaning of this provision. The
provision allows amendments to be proposed in two ways. First,
it permits two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose
amendments. Second, it permits Congress, presumably by
majority vote, to propose an amendment upon application of
two thirds of the state legislatures.
It seems clear that this provision allows the state legislatures
to apply for Congress to propose either an amendment relating
to a subject or a specifically worded amendment. In both cases,
the provision would require Congress to follow the terms of the
applications.
The strength of this interpretation derives from the fact that
the provision requires a two thirds vote when Congress acts on
its own, but allows Congress to use majority rule when it acts on
the applications of the state legislatures. If Congress was not
bound by the state legislatures’ instructions, it is hard to
understand why Congress was required to secure two thirds
when acting on its own, but only a majority when acting pursuant
to state applications. Thus, when the state legislatures require
that Congress propose an amendment concerning a specific
subject, Congress would be obligated to pass an amendment and
could use majority rule. Similarly, when the state legislatures
required that Congress propose a specific amendment, Congress
would also be obligated to pass that amendment and could use
majority rule. The alternative interpretation of Madison’s
proposal—that the state legislatures’ applications were not
binding on the Congress—cannot account for the way that the
provision uses majority and supermajority rules and is therefore
extremely weak.
This straightforward reading of the provision that I offer
also appears to be James Madison’s interpretation of it, which
can be seen by his response to a proposal to amend the
provision. George Mason had argued that Madison’s proposal
gave Congress too great a role in the amendment process.
Mason stated, “As the proposing of amendments is in both the
modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the second,
ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind
would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should
74
become oppressive . . . .” As a result, Gouvernor Morris and
Elbridge Gerry moved to amend the article “so as to require a

74. Id. at 629.
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Convention on application of 2/3 of the States,” which eventually
75
became the final version of Article V. Madison objected to the
Morris/Gerry proposal on the ground that he “did not see why
Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments
applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention on
76
the like application.”
Madison’s response reveals his support for the above
interpretation in two ways. First, the language of his response
suggests that the state legislatures would be applying for
amendments to be proposed. There is not the slightest suggestion
that the state applications would merely allow Congress to
decide on its own what amendments to propose. Second, that
Madison thought his provision would bind Congress as much as
the final Article V also suggests that the states would be
proposing amendments in some form. If Congress were given
discretion as to what amendments to propose, Madison would
not have spoken of it as being bound to the same extent as
Congress is to call a convention.
Moreover, that Mason and the other delegates objected to
Madison’s proposal does not suggest that they disagreed with
Madison’s interpretation of it. Rather, they may have objected
to Congress’s additional role under Madison’s version for other
reasons. First, if the states sought an amendment on a subject,
such as controlling federal debt, Madison’s proposal would give
Congress more ability to block the amendment than the final
Article V did, even though Congress was obligated under Article
V to call the limited convention. While there may be some
discretion involved in deciding whether to call a convention,
there is considerably more discretion involved in drafting an
amendment applied for by the states. Under Madison’s proposal,
Congress could use its role to draft a bad provision or to pass
nothing at all, claiming it could not agree on a specific proposal.
Second, if the states could not agree on either a specifically
worded amendment or a general idea for an amendment, the
power to propose an amendment then would be possessed
entirely by Congress. By contrast, under the final Article V, if
the states could not agree on a specifically worded amendment
or a general idea for an amendment, they could still apply for an
unlimited convention. This would be far preferable from

75. Id.
76. Id. at 629–30.
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Mason’s perspective, because the convention would be
independent of Congress.
The meaning of Madison’s proposal helps to clarify the
meaning of the actual Article V in several important respects.
First, the meaning of Madison’s proposal confirms the analysis of
propose that I offered in Section IIIA above. Under Madison’s
proposal, when two thirds of the state legislatures applied to
Congress for an amendment, Congress was required to propose
that amendment, not just any amendment. But if “propose”
meant unlimited discretion to recommend a measure, as the
unlimited convention view holds, then Madison’s provision
would not have this meaning. By contrast, if “propose” simply
meant “to offer for adoption,” then the provision has exactly the
meaning that Madison and others believed it had. When the
state legislatures apply for an amendment, Congress is required
to offer it for adoption by the ratifiers—to propose it.
Second, the meaning of Madison’s provision is also
revealing as to the language concerning state applications. Both
Madison’s proposal and Article V contain virtually the same
language as to applications—“on the application of two thirds”
of the state legislatures. Under Madison’s proposal, this
language clearly contemplates that the applications can apply for
particular amendments (either in general terms or in specific
language) and that Congress will be bound to follow these
applications. That the actual Article V uses the same language
strongly suggests that application has the same meaning and
therefore adopts the limited convention view on this issue.
Finally, if one does not merely focus on the individual words
“propose” or “apply,” but instead looks at the phrases in the
clauses, this perspective also supports the limited convention
view. Commentators who favor the unlimited convention view
interpret the language in the actual Article V, “The Congress . . .
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,” as not allowing the states to place limits on what the
convention can propose. Part of the argument seems to be that
there is nothing explicit allowing the states to limit the
convention and no implicit authority is implied. But the very
similar language in Madison’s proposal, “The Congress . . . on
the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution,” clearly
allows the states to place limits on what Congress can propose,
even though there is nothing explicit allowing the states to do so.
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It is hard to see the basis of the distinction between Article V
and Madison’s proposal.
Thus, the language in Madison’s proposal strongly suggests
that the final version of Article V adopts the limited convention
view as to the meaning of both state legislative applications and
the convention’s proposing power.
B. INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE RATIFICATION PERIOD
It is not merely the actions of the Philadelphia Convention
that support a limited convention. At least two pieces of
evidence from the period immediately after the Constitution was
written also support the limited convention view.
First, Trench Coxe, who was assistant Secretary of State
under Alexander Hamilton, wrote a letter to the New York
Ratification Convention, urging ratification of the Constitution.
77
In the letter, Coxe wrote :
If two thirds of those legislatures require it, Congress must
call a general convention, even though they dislike the
proposed amendments, and if three fourths of the state
legislatures or conventions approve such proposed amendments, they become an actual and binding part of the
constitution, without any possible interference of Congress.

This quote suggests that Coxe interpreted the Constitution to
78
allow limited conventions. His claim that Congress must call a

77. A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. GAZETTE, June 11, 1788,
reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 1139, 1142–43 (italics omitted).
78. Coxe here refers to a general convention. While some commentators appear to
believe that the term refers to an unlimited convention, Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1634
n.47, at the time of the Framing a general convention did not mean an unlimited
convention. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at xx–xxi, 23.
A general convention was a convention of all the states, in contrast to a partial
convention, which was a convention of a subset of the states. See 6 MADISON’S PAPERS at
425 (noting that Madison and Hamilton, referring to a convention to be held among the
New England states, “disapproved of these partial conventions.” Rather, Madison
“wished instead of them to see a general Convention take place.”) When the Framers’
generation sought to describe an unlimited convention, they used the terms plenary or
plenipotentiary. See James Madison to James Monroe, March 19, 1786, in 8 MADISON’S
PAPERS at 505 (contrasting the limited Annapolis Convention with a hypothetical
unlimited convention which would have involved “a plenipotentiary commission to their
deputies for the convention”); Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, Sept. 3, 1780, in 2
HAMILTON PAPERS at 407–08 (recommending the “calling immediately [of] a convention
of all the states . . . vested with plenipotentiary authority” to bring about “a solid coercive
union.”).
This understanding of general and plenipotentiary is also supported by the meanings
of these terms when not used in relation to conventions. For example, Webster’s
dictionary defines general as “common to many or the greatest number; as a general
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convention, even though it dislikes the proposed amendments,
suggests that the applications are seeking a convention limited to
proposing certain amendments. Of course, the quote is not
entirely free of ambiguity. It is possible that Coxe is referring to
a situation where the applications were not seeking a convention
limited to a specific amendment, but it was known that the state
legislators intended the convention to propose those
amendments. Still, the wording of the quote suggests that the
applications were seeking a convention limited to proposing
specific amendments and therefore the quote supports the
limited convention view.
Second, one of the first two applications for a convention
under the new Constitution also supports the limited convention
view. After the Constitution was put into effect, two states made
applications for a convention. The movement for a second
convention stalled, however, after James Madison led the
Congress to propose a bill of rights. While New York’s
applications sought a plenary or unlimited convention, Virginia’s
application may have sought a limited convention. The
application asked that “a convention be immediately called . . .
with full power to take into their consideration the defects of the
Constitution that have been suggested by the State Conventions,
and report such amendments thereto as they shall find best
suited to promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves
and our latest posterity the great and unalienable rights of
79
mankind.” It is possible that this application sought a
convention limited to proposing amendments on problems
identified by the ratification debates. This would prevent
federalists from controlling the convention and proposing
provisions that would make the Constitution even more
nationalist. Of course, the language here is pretty vague and
seems to allow the convention wide discretion. But even if it is
not read as establishing a limited convention, the phrasing of the
application still supports a limited convention. It asks for a
convention “with full power to take into their consideration” the
opinion; a general custom.” Similarly, the Constitution’s preamble states as a purpose to
“promote the general welfare.” Further, in Federalist No. 43, James Madison states the
Constitution “equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the
amendment of errors.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 296 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). Clearly, the reference to the federal government as the general
government suggests that it is the common government of all the people (in contrast to
particular state governments). It would not indicate a government of unlimited powers,
since the Federalist strongly argued the general government had limited powers.
79. 1 House Journal, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1789).
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defects in the Constitution suggested by the state conventions.
That the application asked for a convention with “full power”
suggests that it believed that conventions with less power were
possible. Thus, whether or not this is read as seeking a limited
convention, it provides some support for the limited convention
view.
V. THE LIMITED CONVENTION VIEW: PURPOSE AND
STRUCTURE
These largely textual arguments in favor of the limited
convention view are also supported by two arguments based on
purpose and structure. These three arguments suggest that the
constitutional enactors would have had strong reasons to allow
limited conventions. First, if limited conventions were not
recognized by the Constitution, then the constitutional enactors’
decision to have the states determine whether to hold a
convention would seem peculiar. Why would the Constitution
allow the states to decide on whether to have a convention, but
not allow them to specify what subjects the convention should
discuss? Put differently, why would the constitutional enactors
allow the states to decide not to hold any convention—and
thereby to determine that none of the current problems warrant
a convention—but not allow them the lesser power of
determining that only certain problems warrant a convention?
A second purpose and structure argument for the limited
convention view is that allowing the state legislatures to apply
for a limited convention permits a more effective amendment
procedure. While the state legislatures may desire an unlimited
convention to make broad constitutional changes, they might
instead seek a limited convention to address smaller problems.
The state legislatures might believe that a narrower
constitutional change is all that is needed and fear the
80
uncertainty of an unlimited convention. By denying the state
legislatures the ability to apply for limited conventions, the
unlimited convention view imposes an uncertainty tax on the
convention method and makes it less likely that state legislatures
will apply for a convention. This is especially problematic since
the Constitution views the congressional proposal method and
the convention method as alternative procedures useful to
80. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 990 (arguing that a convention is most likely
to be called in response to some “particular usurpations” by Congress and that a limited
convention would be the appropriate way to address a specific concern).
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preventing any one entity from blocking amendments. Thus, the
limited convention view will further the constitutional purpose
of permitting the convention method to be an effective
81
alternative to the congressional proposal method.
Third, the limited convention view employs a more
effective mechanism for adopting amendments when there is
reason to believe that the Constitution has a defect that requires
a specific remedy. When two thirds of the state legislatures have
concluded that a specific subject or amendment needs to be
considered, there are significant advantages to limiting the
convention to addressing that subject rather than allowing it to
propose amendments on any subject. To begin with, limiting the
convention to a specific area allows for delegates to be selected
who have expertise in that area. Limiting the convention to a
specific area should also operate to make the convention’s
review of the issue simpler and smoother. A limited convention
is likely to reach a quicker resolution, since it only needs to
discuss one issue. Moreover, an unlimited convention could
easily take actions that would result in the specific amendment
not being enacted, even though it would have enacted under a
limited convention. For example, the convention might choose
to propose one or more amendments on other subjects and then
conclude that it should not propose the specific amendment,
because that would amount to too significant a change in the
Constitution. Alternatively, the convention might end up
deadlocking on other amendments, with the resulting discord
leading the delegates to dissolve the convention rather than
considering the specific amendment.
These three arguments suggest that the constitutional
enactors would have had substantial reasons to adopt the limited
convention view. Are there reasons for them to have adopted
the unlimited convention view? The strongest argument on the
other side is the view that the constitutional enactors would not
have wanted the states to have too significant a role in the
constitutional amendment process. Therefore, they would have
allowed the state legislatures to call an unlimited convention—
which the states would be unlikely to do often and would have
no formal control over—but not a limited convention, which

81. Moreover, this constitutional purpose is not merely hypothetical. Because of the
fear of a runaway convention, the convention method has proven to be an ineffective,
broken amendment method. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
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would allow them too much ability to influence the amendment
proposing process.
The problem with this view is that it requires a hostility
towards the states that was not held generally when the
Constitution was enacted. Instead, the Constitution was based
on the view that both the national government and the state
governments had virtues and vices and the constitutional
structure should be designed accordingly. In the Article V area,
this view suggests that both Congress and the state legislatures
should be able to propose (and ultimately enact) amendments
82
without the other entity being able to veto the amendment.
Thus, the desire to prevent the state legislatures from having an
effective mechanism to amend the Constitution is inconsistent
with the overall design of the Constitution and the purposes
underlying it.
VI. WEAKNESSES OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE
UNLIMITED CONVENTION VIEW
These arguments for the limited convention view are
powerful. They both show that the limited convention view
derives from the ordinary meaning of the constitutional language
and give strong reasons why the constitutional enactors would
have wanted the constitution to allow limited conventions. But
there are three other arguments that have been made against
limited conventions that should be addressed. It turns out,
however, that these arguments are ineffective. Thus, the case for
the limited convention view also draws strength from the
weakness of the arguments made against that view.
A. A CONVENTION IS NOT AN UNLIMITED ASSEMBLY
OF THE PEOPLE
Some commentators have argued that the convention
cannot be limited because it is an illimitable assembly of the
83
people. The idea here seems to be that a convention is a special
body that represents and exercises the sovereign power of the
people. Since the people are the ultimate sovereigns, no limits
can be placed on them or the convention. But this argument is
mistaken on both textual and historical grounds.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
83. See e.g., Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738.
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1. Text
Textually, it seems clear that the national proposing
convention (as well as the Constitution’s ratification
conventions) should not be viewed as exercising the full
sovereignty of the people and therefore as illimitable. There are
several strong reasons that support this conclusion. First, if the
national proposing convention sought to deprive the states,
without their consent, of their equal suffrage in the Senate, the
convention would be violating a clear textual command and
would be acting illegally. Similarly, if the convention’s proposed
amendment stated that it would be subject to ratification by two
thirds of the states (as opposed to the three quarters that the
Constitution requires), this action would also be clearly illegal.
Thus, it is mistaken to claim that the Constitution cannot limit
the convention.
A second reason why the national proposing convention is
not illimitable is that it is a mere proposing convention. A
convention for proposing amendments does not have the power
to enact anything. It merely proposes an amendment that must
then be ratified by states. Similarly, the ratification conventions
in the Constitution are also limited. They do not have the power
to propose amendments. Nor do they have the power to take
other actions, such as legislating.
Finally, that the Constitution does not view the conventions
as illimitable assertions of the sovereignty of the people is
confirmed by the fact that the conventions’ roles can also be
served by legislatures, which are clearly not exercising sovereign
authority. While the national proposing convention has the
power to propose an amendment, so does the Congress.
Similarly, while state conventions can be used to ratify an
amendment, so can state legislatures. Thus, the conventions are
unlikely to be exercising sovereign authority if the non-sovereign
legislatures can be given the same authority that the conventions
exercise. Instead, the conventions are better seen as limited
institutions, employed as alternatives to the legislature, to
improve the amendment process.
Thus, textually, the Constitution makes it absolutely clear
that neither the national proposing convention nor the state
ratification conventions are immune from being limited. The
Constitution places limits on the provisions that they can
propose or ratify; it limits their roles to proposing or ratifying,
but not both; and it employs non-sovereign legislatures to
perform these same rules. Given that the Constitution does not
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treat the conventions as illimitable assertions of sovereign
power, there is no reason to infer that the Constitution does not
authorize the state legislatures to apply for limited conventions.
The Constitution employs conventions as part of a multi-stage
process designed to produce desirable amendments. Allowing
state legislatures to apply for limits on the national proposing
convention is easily seen as a means to that end.
2. History
If the fact that a convention can be limited is so textually
evident, why does this idea of the convention as an illimitable
assembly of the people seem plausible to some commentators?
The short answer is that at the time of the Constitution’s
enactment, conventions had various meanings and had different
powers depending on the context. Some conventions exercised
quite significant powers, resembling those of a sovereign. But
the fact that some conventions had these characteristics does not
mean that all or most did. Other conventions exercised much
more limited authority. Thus, it is entirely proper to follow the
textual and structural cues in the Constitution that suggest the
proposing and ratifying conventions were limited, even though
some conventions at the time of the Constitution had much
broader power.
To understand the meaning of “convention” at the time of
the Constitution, it is useful to briefly review the history of
conventions. The term “convention” came to prominence in 17th
century England. After the revolutions in 1660 and 1689, there
was no King in existence to call the Parliament and therefore
84
these Parliaments met on their own authority. These bodies
were known as Convention Parliaments. In both cases, the
Convention Parliaments legislated fundamental arrangements
85
that were deemed to be part of the English Constitution. Thus,
a convention was thought of as a means of enacting a constitution or establishing a government when existing laws did not
86
provide a mechanism for doing so.
It was thus natural that the new states would use
conventions when they established their new constitutions and
governments after declaring independence from the King. Yet,

84. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8; see also GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 311 (1969).
85. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8.
86. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 7–8; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8.
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the understanding of conventions at the time was still quite
undeveloped. Although some states used conventions to write
87
their constitutions, others used legislatures to do so. Moreover,
some of these conventions also exercised ordinary legislative
88
powers. Thus, conventions were not yet clearly understood to
be entities that had only the power of drafting or enacting a
constitution.
The first conventions that only exercised constitutional
enactment powers were those of New Hampshire and
89
Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, the legislature had made
several unsuccessful attempts to write a constitution that were
rejected on the ground that the drafting should occur by an
entity limited solely to that task. Finally, in 1779, the legislature
accepted the principle and scheduled elections for a
constitutional convention that wrote a constitution, which was
90
then approved by the towns. Similarly, the New Hampshire
constitution was written by a convention solely limited to that
91
task, and then sent to the people for ratification. Thus, it took
several years before two states clearly adopted an approach
where constitutions were adopted by conventions that were
employed solely for that purpose.
The convention method of enacting constitutional
provisions was also developed in other ways. Once a constitution
was enacted, the constitution could also authorize its own
amendment. This was a very significant development, because it
meant that it was no longer necessary to take extra-legal or
revolutionary actions when one sought to change the
constitution. Given the role of conventions in the writing of
constitutions, it was natural for the new constitutions to use
conventions as part of their amendment procedures as well.
In an effort to devise desirable amendment procedures,
these constitution used conventions in a variety of ways. Some
constitutions gave conventions relatively limited powers. As
discussed earlier, the 1777 Georgia Constitution, employed a
87. ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE,
POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 2–4 (1917); See e.g., JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 135.
88. See HOAR, supra note 87, at 4; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 136–37 (South
Carolina), 139–40 (New Jersey); 193 (Pennsylvania); 145 (Maryland); 146 (North
Carolina); 147–49 (Georgia); 150 (New York) (discussing the general legislative powers
of individual state conventions).
89. HOAR, supra note 87, at 4–5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 118–120.
90. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 13; HOAR, supra note 87, at 5–6; JAMESON, supra note
31, at §§ 142–143.
91. HOAR, supra note 87, at 6; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 120–121.
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constitutional convention to enact constitutional amendments,
but did so only if the convention was called by petitions from the
people and only if the convention enacted provisions that had
92
been sought by those petitions. In two other state constitutions,
the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and the 1784 Vermont
Constitution, conventions were employed solely to ratify
93
measures proposed by a council of censors. Further, the 1784
New Hampshire Constitution provided for the legislature, in
seven year’s time, to have the towns elect delegates to a
convention to propose constitutional amendments, which would
only take effect if approved by two thirds of the voters collected
94
in the towns.
Other constitutions authorized more powerful conventions.
The following three conventions, once called, appeared to have
the authority to enact constitutional provisions without further
ratification. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided that
two thirds of the voters could authorize a constitutional
95
convention in 1795. The 1790 South Carolina Constitution
allowed a “convention of the people” to be called upon the vote
96
of two thirds of both branches of the legislature. Finally, the
Delaware Constitution of 1792 allowed a majority of the people
97
eligible to vote to authorize the calling of a convention.
Finally, some of these constitutions were amended or
replaced through conventions, even though the constitution did
not expressly provide for such actions. For example, the
Massachusetts Constitution was amended in 1820 by a
convention called by the legislature, even though this
amendment procedure was not specifically provided for in the
98
constitution. Similarly, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 was
replaced in 1792 after the legislature called a convention that the
99
constitution did not specifically authorize. The actions of these
types of conventions, which were usually called by the
legislature, can be conceptualized in one of three ways. First,
they might categorized as revolutionary actions that violated the
previous constitution and therefore were illegal. Second, they

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII.
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; VT. CONST. of 1786, § XL.
N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2. art. 100.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch.VI, art. X.
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. XI.
DEL. CONST. of 1792 art X..
Jameson, supra note 31, at § 219.
Id. at § 223.
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might be viewed as actions that were neither authorized nor
prohibited by the previous constitution. In this unusual category,
the constitution would not authorize the convention, but it
would not prohibit it, thereby allowing a convention that
represents the people to act on its own authority to frame a new
constitution. Finally, the actions of the conventions might be
viewed as having been implicitly authorized by the previous
constitution. While the constitution did not contain a specific
provision that authorized the convention, the constitution’s
structure and principles were viewed as authorizing the action.
None of these categories, however, provide support for the
unlimited convention view. The unlimited convention view
argues that the Constitution authorizes unlimited conventions.
But under the first two categories—revolutionary and
unauthorized conventions—the state conventions were not
authorized by the existing constitution. Thus, these unauthorized
state conventions were not precedents for the type of authorized
convention that the unlimited convention asserts the
Constitution established. If these two type of state conventions
were to inform the meaning of the proposing convention, then
that convention would not derive its power from the
Constitution. It would have extraconstitutional powers. That is
simply not the argument made by the unlimited convention view.
Nor does the third category of implicitly authorized
conventions provide support for the unlimited convention view.
Such implicitly authorized conventions do not comport well with
the structure of the Constitution and therefore it is unlikely that
the Constitution could be interpreted to implicitly authorize such
100
Moreover, even if these conventions were
conventions.
100. The United States Constitution is not easily interpreted as implicitly authorizing
a convention. To be implicitly authorized, such a convention would have to be derived
from constitutional structure and general principles rather than from a specific provision.
This claim will make most sense in a constitution which has a strong textual commitment
to popular sovereignty, vests general legislative powers in the legislature (so that it can
call the convention), and does not have ample amendment procedures which appear to
“occupy the field” of amendment matters. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. 2, ch. VI,
art. X. While the U.S. Constitution does endorse popular sovereignty, it confers only
enumerated powers on the Congress and also has ample amendment procedures. For an
argument in favor of the implicit authorized view (that also allows contrary to text
amendments, such as those depriving states of their equal voting rights in the Senate), see
generally Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar 1988]; Akhil Reed Amar,
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar 1994]; for a critique, see generally Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People(s), Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996).
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implicitly authorized, they would not support the unlimited
convention view, since (as discussed in the preceding paragraph)
that view makes claims about the explicitly authorized
101
conventions in Article V, not implicitly authorized ones.
We can now turn to the implications of this history for the
United States Constitution. First, the history helps to explain
why some commentators might regard the proposing convention
as an illimitable assertion of the sovereignty of the people, even
though the constitutional text so clearly places limits on the
convention. At the time of the Constitution, some conventions
were seen as specially representing the sovereignty of the
people. These conventions had significant power to enact
constitutions. But over time, the concept of a convention
developed. Conventions also came to be used in more limited
ways as part of constitutionally established multi-step processes
for constitutional change. These constitutional processes could
be used not merely for enacting a new constitution, but also for
amending the constitution. Moreover, these constitutional
processes placed limits on the powers of conventions. Thus, the
commentators who have interpreted the proposing convention
as an illimitable convention are making a mistake that is easy to
identify. Their mistake is to interpret an ambiguous term to have
one meaning when the context makes clear that it has a different
meaning.
This analysis also confirms the analysis of the constitutional
language that I presented earlier. The Constitution speaks of a
“Convention for proposing Amendments.” Why did the enactors

My own view is that the only area where an implicitly authorized convention might
be plausible is a convention that would replace the existing constitution with a new
constitution. Although there are still strong arguments against it, Article V might be read
as “occupying the field” of amendments but not the field of establishing a new
constitution. To my mind, an even stronger interpretation is to view such a convention as
neither prohibited nor authorized (the second category) rather than as implicitly
authorized. Whether or not conventions that seek to establish a new constitution are
viewed as in the second or third category, however, they do not support the limited
convention view, which views the convention as expressly authorized. See supra Part III.
101. The reason these implicitly authorized conventions do not support the
unlimited convention view is that these conventions are not Article V conventions. An
implicitly authorized convention is one that is implicitly authorized as opposed to the
proposing convention in Article V, which is explicitly authorized. The unlimited
convention view makes a claim about the power of the Article V convention, not about
the power of other conventions. Thus, even if the Constitution does implicitly authorize
conventions (and those conventions are unlimited), it does not mean the Article V
conventions are unlimited. The Article V convention could be a limited one, while the
implicitly authorized one could be unlimited.
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use this language? This history makes clear that they needed to
indicate that the convention could only propose amendments; it
could not enact them on their own authority or exercise other
powers, such as passing ordinary laws. The language a
“Convention for proposing Amendments” does exactly that.
There is no need to search for additional functions of the
language to make sense of its inclusion in the Constitution.
Moreover, the language becomes even clearer when it is
contrasted with the other type of convention in the
Constitution—the ratification convention. The proposing
convention can only propose amendments; the ratification
convention can only ratify them. Neither type of convention has
the authority on its own to enact constitutional provisions.
B. THE RUNAWAY PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION
Another argument sometimes made against the limited
convention view is that the Philadelphia Convention ignored the
limits placed on it by both Congress under the Articles of
Confederation and the state legislatures and therefore was a
runaway convention. Thus, one might conclude that the
Philadelphia Convention likewise believed that Congress’s
power under the Constitution should not be binding on the
national convention. Consequently, it would be constitutional
for the convention to ignore the limits on Congress’s call.
The experience of the Philadelphia Convention, however,
cannot be applied so quickly to the United States Constitution.
Instead, the Convention’s actions are best explained as based
either on the view that the Articles were no longer legally
binding due to prior infractions or on the belief that
revolutionary and therefore illegal action was justified as
necessary to save the nation. Neither the Convention delegates
nor its defenders argued that limits placed in a call were not
legally binding. Instead, they sought to camouflage or minimize
102
the extent of their violation of the limits.
102. My argument here assumes that the Philadelphia Convention was a runaway
convention. Robert Natelson contends, however, that the Philadelphia Convention was
not such a convention. Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by
Convention: Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). If he is
correct, then, this supports my interpretation even more strongly. Unfortunately, I am
not at all certain that Natelson is correct. Natelson states that there were two types of
limits placed on the convention: limits imposed by the state legislatures on their
delegations to the convention and limits established by the Congress, under the Articles
of Confederation, in their call for the convention. Natelson acknowledges that the
Convention exceeded the limits imposed by Congress, but argues that Congress’s

!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

LIMITED CONVENTION

6/7/2012 3:19 PM

99

One way that the Philadelphia Convention might have
understood its actions is as proposing a new constitution, not
because conventions had inherent authority to do so, but
because the Articles of Confederation had been seriously and
repeatedly violated and therefore was no longer deemed
binding. James Madison made the argument that state violations
had rendered the Articles, as a treaty, voidable, and Akhil Amar
has argued that the new Constitution therefore could have
103
legally superseded the Articles. If this was the Convention’s
view of the matter, its actions would not say anything about the
power of a proposing convention under the United States
Constitution.
The Philadelphia Convention might also have understood
its actions as being illegal under existing law, but as justified on
policy grounds by the pressing problems that the states and the
nation faced under the Articles. In other words, the Convention
was understood as proposing a revolutionary action, but one that
was necessary to provide the nation with a desirable political
order. Madison argues along these lines in Federalist No. 40
where he appears to acknowledge that the Convention’s
proposal departed from Articles’ unanimity requirement for
amendments that was specifically mentioned in the call for the
Convention. Madison justified the departure as necessary,
because the smallest state, Rhode Island, would have refused to
ratify anything the Convention proposed. He claims that it was

limitations were not contained in a “legal call,” since “Congress had no power to issue
such a call.” Id. at 720. By contrast, Natelson interprets the state legislative authorizations broadly and thereby concludes that the Convention conformed to the instructions
in 10 of the 12 states. Thus, Natelson concludes that the Convention did not exceed the
only limits that were binding.
Even assuming both that Natelson’s interpretation of the state directions is correct
and that following 10 of the 12 states is sufficient, there is a strong argument that the
Congress did have authority over the Philadelphia Convention. Based on the evidence,
one can view the Philadelphia Convention as an advisory or drafting committee
established by the Congress to recommend amendments to it. The Articles provided that
amendments were first to “be agreed to in” Congress “and be afterwards confirmed by
the legislatures of every State.” The Congress then called for the Philadelphia
Convention with the instruction that the Convention “report . . . to Congress” its
proposed revisions to the Articles. These actions are entirely consistent with the view
that Congress was using the Philadelphia Convention as an advisory committee. If this
was the Convention’s role, then the Congress would have had authority over the
“committee” and therefore the Convention’s failure to follow Congress’s directions
might very well make it a runaway convention.
103. See Amar 1988, supra note 100, at 1048; Amar 1994, supra note 100, at 465; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 316 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
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the Convention’s duty to make this departure, because the
104
welfare of the nation was in jeopardy.
These two explanations for the Convention’s actions, for
which there is significant support, do not suggest that the
Convention believed it was not legally bound by the limits in the
call. Is there any evidence for the opposite conclusion? The best
evidence would be statements, made both at the Convention and
in defense of its work, that a proposing convention cannot be
limited and therefore that it actions were proper. The defenders
of the unlimited convention view, however, have not offered
such evidence.
Instead, the defenses of the Convention’s actions are
framed differently. James Madison, for example, attempted to
deny or minimize that the convention was departing from the
105
call. It is only when it becomes clear that the Convention has
departed, by changing the ratification method from unanimity of
state legislatures to nine-thirteenths of conventions, that
Madison grudgingly admits it. This is not how someone would
106
argue who believed they were not bound by the call.
C. THE SUPPOSED INTENT TO AVOID RELIANCE ON BOTH
CONGRESS AND THE STATE LEGISLATURES
Walter Dellinger has also argued against a limited
convention based on his interpretation of the intent of the
Framers revealed in the Philadelphia Convention debates.
Reviewing the statements made at the convention as well as the
evolution of the amendment provisions, Dellinger discerns two
“themes” of the debates concerning the amendment provisions:
that “state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify
107
amendments that enhance their power” and that “Congress
108
should not have exclusive power to propose amendments.”
104. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 290 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961) (“The forebearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of
the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a
thirteenth . . . .”).
105. Id.
106. It might also be argued that the Philadelphia Convention believed that there
could not be a limited convention at all (as opposed to the claim discussed in the text that
it believed that the limits were not binding). But the same evidence that disproves the
claim discussed in the text also refutes this claim.
107. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1630. Dellinger’s description of the first theme
here—that “state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify amendments that
enhance their power”—is problematic for a variety of reasons. To begin with, even under
a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, state legislatures do not
propose amendments. As discussed below, the convention must decide to propose the
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From these two themes, Dellinger then concludes that the
Framers would not have desired the limited convention view.
First, he argues that conventions limited to a specifically worded
amendment would allow the states more power than the
Framers would have desired. If two thirds of the states applied
for a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment (or
to a very narrowly defined subject), that would give the states
too much authority in the proposal process, since they could
both propose and ratify the amendment.
Second, he argues that a convention limited to a specific
subject would allow Congress more power over the convention
than the Framers would have desired. If two thirds of the states
applied for a convention on a subject, the limited convention
view would require that Congress “define and enforce” the
limits on the convention, which would give Congress too much
109
power over the amendment method. In particular, Dellinger
believes that Congress would have to determine whether
applications that differed slightly or significantly from one
another should be counted as applying for the same convention.
It is important to emphasize that the methodology of
Dellinger’s paper—like that of many of the other articles about
Article V from the same period—has fallen out of fashion,
especially among originalists. Rather than seeking the original
meaning of the constitutional language, Dellinger seeks to
discern the drafters’ intent from statements made, and the
evolution of provisions, at the Philadelphia Convention. This
approach has been subject to a variety of criticisms, including
that it asks what the drafters who merely proposed the
Constitution intended rather than what the Constitution meant
to the country and the ratifiers who adopted it. But even
assuming that one were to engage in this type of inquiry,
Dellinger’s argument suffers from serious infirmities. In
particular, the intent that Dellinger claims to divine from the

amendment. In addition, even if the state legislatures did have power to propose an
amendment, they would not necessarily have (or even be likely to have) control over the
ratification. After all, if the state legislatures apply for an amendment that enhances their
own power, and the convention approves it, Congress would then be likely to allocate the
ratification decision to state conventions rather than to state legislatures, in the hope that
the conventions might refuse to ratify it. Given the problems with Dellinger’s description
of the first theme, I will interpret him as making the more plausible claim that the
Framers would not have desired the states to have excessive power over the proposal and
ratification process. This will allow his argument to be considered in its strongest light.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1631.
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Philadelphia Convention is unclear and supports the limited
convention view at least as much as the unlimited one.
1. The States’ Alleged Excessive Power
Let’s start with Dellinger’s claim that a convention limited
to a specifically worded amendment would allow the states more
power than the Framers would have desired. There are two basic
problems with Dellinger’s claim here: his inference that the
Framers did not want the states to have significant influence
over the proposing power and his argument that the Framers
would not have desired conventions limited to a specifically
worded amendment.
Starting with the first problem, Dellinger’s inference that
the convention would not have wanted the states to have a
110
significant role over the proposing power is problematic. The
strongest evidence that he has here is from one delegate—
Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton objected to a proposal that
provided, “On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this
Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a
Convention for that purpose.” Hamilton argued:
The mode proposed was not adequate. The State Legislatures
will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase their
own powers— The National Legislature will be the first to
perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of
amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two
111
thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention.

Thus, Hamilton opposed the provision because it gave the state
legislatures power to apply for alterations with a view to
increasing their powers. Dellinger infers from this that Hamilton
opposed allowing states too much power in the amendment
process and eventually uses this purpose to conclude that the
Framers would have opposed a convention limited to a
specifically worded amendment.
But Dellinger’s argument here is doubtful. The best
understanding of Hamilton’s view is not that he was opposed to
states having a significant role in the amendment process.
Instead, it is that he was opposed to an amendment process that
did not allow Congress to initiate amendments without the prior

110. See id. at 1633.
111. 2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 558.
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consent of the states. He did not oppose the states being able to
propose amendments; he merely believed that Congress should
also be able to propose amendments. Several pieces of evidence
support this interpretation. First, the provision Hamilton was
criticizing would have given the state legislatures the exclusive
power to initiate amendments—a convention could not be called
unless the state legislatures applied for one. Hamilton’s words
directly address this point. Because the state legislatures are
focused on “increas[ing] their own powers,” they ought not to
have the sole power to propose amendments. Instead, Congress
112
“ought also to be empowered” to call a convention.
Second, this interpretation of Hamilton’s position gains
support from the fact that once the amendment provision was
altered to permit Congress as well as the state legislatures to
propose amendments, neither Hamilton nor other nationalists
voiced this objection to the amendment provision. In fact,
Hamilton was even willing to support a provision that clearly
gave the states the power to propose amendments without the
consent of the Congress or a national convention. Madison’s
proposal discussed above, which Dellinger admits is most
plausibly interpreted to require Congress to submit the
amendments applied for by the state legislatures, was seconded
113
by Hamilton. This strongly suggests that Hamilton was not
opposed to having state legislatures decide on specific proposals,
so long as the Congress also had an independent means of
proposing amendments.
How, then, can Dellinger interpret Hamilton’s words to
suggest that the states should not have the power to apply for
specific amendments? One possibility is that Dellinger has
misinterpreted the chronology of the convention. In describing
the convention’s consideration of these matters, he writes that
the convention had agreed on “a concurrent power to Congress
and the state legislatures to initiate the amendment process” and
had “easily agreed on the method by which Congress would
114
propose amendments.” He then writes that the debate then
focused on the alternative amendment method for the states.
While “Mason of Virginia objected to congressional control over
the proposal” of amendments, “set against his concerns was the
threat, perceived by Hamilton, that the states would seek to

112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. 2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 559.
114. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1625.
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enhance their power at the expense of the federal government.”
He concludes that “the drafters’ answer to this dilemma was to
provide that a national convention to propose amendments be
summoned at the request of two-thirds of the state
115
legislatures.”
But this description of the convention proceedings is
misleading. As I have shown, Hamilton’s objections were not
made to a method under which Congress could propose
amendments on its own. Rather, he objected to a method that
gave the state legislatures the sole power to initiate the
amendment process. Thus, one cannot infer that Hamilton
116
opposed significant state involvement in the proposal process.
We can now turn to the second problem with Dellinger’s
claim: Dellinger has weak arguments for why the Philadelphia
Convention would have opposed a convention limited to a
specifically worded amendment. He maintains that a convention
limited to voting on whether or not to propose a specific
amendment would have had little purpose, merely serving the
function of “delaying the amendment process” and thereby
117
providing additional time for reflection and debate. But it is
not clear why Dellinger reads the convention’s function so

115. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1625–26.
116. Dellinger also relies on Roger Sherman’s objection to Madison’s proposal
(discussed above) of an amendment provision, which would have allowed the states to
apply for Congress to pass an amendment. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1627–28.
Sherman objected to the proposal on the ground that “three-quarters of the States might
be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or
depriving them of their equality in the Senate.” Dellinger claims that the change to the
final Article V “might be seen as responsive to Sherman’s concern, for it provided that a
national convention, rather than the states, would formulate proposed amendments.” Id.
Dellinger’s argument here, however, is quite a reach. First, if Sherman was
concerned about protecting the states, then relying on a national institution (the
convention), rather than the states, seems like a counterintuitive strategy. Moreover,
employing a national convention that could act based on a majority vote would be less
protective of “particular States” than relying on a two thirds vote of the states generally.
(Although Dellinger does not make the argument, it might be thought that requiring two
thirds of the state legislatures would be redundant, since three quarters of the states are
required for ratification. But the Congress can choose ratification by state conventions
and therefore having two thirds of the state legislatures approve the amendment would
be an additional check.)
Finally, rather than Sherman’s concerns leading to the adoption of a national
convention method, it seems that they led to other changes in Madison’s proposal. Once
Madison’s proposal was replaced with a national proposing convention, Sherman sought
to amend it by adding a provision stating “that no State shall without its consent be
affected in its internal police, or deprived ot its equal suffrage in the Senate.” 2
RECORDS, supra note 52, at 630. The first part of the provision relating to internal police
did not pass, but the second part was added to Article V.
117. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1632.

!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

LIMITED CONVENTION

6/7/2012 3:19 PM

105

narrowly. The convention does not merely have the power to
delay the amendment. The convention has the power to refuse
to propose the amendment applied for by the states. This is a
veto. Few people regard the President’s veto over legislation as
118
inconsequential; it is not clear why this veto is any different.
The convention’s veto means that a national forum must agree
to propose the amendment and it can choose not to do so. This is
an important power.
Dellinger also argues that the Framers would not have
intended a convention limited to a specifically worded
amendment, because calling and holding the convention would
have involved a great deal of work just to vote on a
119
predetermined amendment.
This argument, however, suffers from two problems. First, it
seems problematic to argue that a convention limited to a
specifically worded amendment would not be worth the effort.
As discussed, that convention has a crucial role—it is the sole
national institution that reviews the proposed amendment and it
has the power to veto the proposed amendment. Thus, the
convention’s role seems important enough to justify its
existence. While this convention does not do any drafting, that
does not mean its function is unimportant. The Constitution
employs state ratifying conventions, which also do no drafting,
and no one believes that is odd or inappropriate.
Second, Dellinger focuses only on a convention limited to a
specifically worded amendment. But the Framers did not restrict
the states to applying only for this type of convention. Rather,
they also allowed the states to apply for an unlimited convention
or a convention limited to a subject. Thus, the question is not
whether it would have made sense for the Framers to have
established a procedure only for conventions limited to
specifically worded amendments, but instead whether it would
have made sense to have allowed the states to call either an
unlimited convention, a convention limited to a general subject,
or a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment.
This convention method makes perfect sense, since it allows the
state legislatures to decide what type of convention the
particular circumstances required.

118. In fact, this veto is much stronger than the President’s, since it is absolute veto
that cannot be overridden.
119. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1632–33.
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2. Congress’s Alleged Excessive Power
Having shown that the debates at the Philadelphia
Convention do not suggest that the Framers would have
opposed a convention limited to a specifically worded
amendment, we can now turn to Dellinger’s claims about a
convention limited to a subject. Dellinger argues that a
convention limited to a sufficiently broad subject might avoid
the problems discussed above, but would suffer from another
problem. If the different states apply for a single convention
limited to a subject, but submit applications with differing
language, then this will require the Congress to determine
whether the states have applied for the same convention and, if
120
so, to determine what the limits of that convention are.
Dellinger argues that the Framers would not have intended for
Congress to have this power, because the purpose of the
convention method was to provide an amendment method that
did not require Congress’s consent and Congress might abuse its
power in an effort to sabotage an amendment. Once again, there
are several serious problems with Dellinger’s argument.
First, Dellinger’s argument that the Framers would not have
desired the Congress to be involved in determining what limits
the states had applied for is unsupported. The Framers, of
course, do not discuss the specific issue. Although initially it
might seem reasonable to infer that the Framers would have
always desired Congress to have less power, that is not
necessarily the case. The Philadelphia Convention did not
entirely strip Congress from participating in the convention
process. Congress is clearly given the role of calling the
convention, which requires that it decide a host of matters. Even
under the unlimited convention view that Dellinger assumes,
Congress must make numerous decisions, including how long
state applications for a convention last, whether states can
withdraw their applications, whether applications sent to the
wrong place count, whether state applications that have not
received the approval of the governor count, whether applications that seek a limited convention should be counted for an
unlimited convention, whether Congress can regulate the voting
rule at the convention, whether Congress can regulate the
120. For example, if some states apply for a convention that will propose an
amendment that limits debt, and other states apply for one that will propose a limit on
debt and taxes, the Congress will have to determine whether they have applied for the
same convention and, if so, to determine whether that convention can make a proposal
limiting taxation.
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number of delegates from each state, and whether Congress can
regulate the method of appointing or electing convention
121
delegates. In addition, Congress is expressly given the power to
decide whether the proposed amendment should be ratified by
122
state legislatures or conventions.
Thus, the Framers did not uniformly disfavor a
congressional role. Rather, they gave Congress a limited role,
appearing to allow Congress to act when the Framers believed
the advantages outweighed the costs. Since it is quite possible
that the Framers believed that having a limited convention was
worth the additional congressional involvement, Dellinger has
not pointed to anything in the convention debates to suggest the
Framers would not have allowed for limited conventions.
Second, even if one assumes that the Philadelphia
Convention did want to minimize Congress’s ability to block
amendments under the convention method, the delegates still
might have adopted the limited convention view. Although the
limited convention view might give Congress more of a role, the
dangers from that additional role might be outweighed by the
problems created by allowing only unlimited conventions. Under
the unlimited convention view, state legislatures may fear
applying for unlimited conventions out of the concern that such
conventions might propose amendments the state legislatures
strongly oppose. If that fear leaves the convention method
ineffective, then Congress would have more ability to block
amendments under the unlimited convention view than under
the limited convention view, because the only workable
convention method would be the congressional proposal
method. Thus, one cannot even infer that the Framers would
have adopted the unlimited convention view had they been
solely focused on minimizing Congress’s ability to obstruct
amendments.
Finally, the case for concluding that the Framers would have
opposed limited conventions is further weakened when one
recognizes that the harm to the convention method from
congressional involvement is much smaller than Dellinger
suggests. Under the limited convention view, the states have a

121. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 105–14, 146–49.
122. U.S. CONST. art. V. Congress’s power to decide on the ratification method is a
significant power. Not only is the method important for influencing whether a proposed
amendment will be ratified; it is also subject to abuse because Congress might fail to
choose a ratification method, which might cause an amendment never to be ratified.
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choice. If they believe that the risk of Congress acting
improperly is too great, they can always choose to apply for an
unlimited convention, which would leave them in the same place
that Dellinger’s interpretation would. But if they believe the
risks are small enough—or the benefits outweigh this risk—then
they can apply for a convention limited to a subject. Moreover,
to reduce the risks of Congress abusing its power, the different
states can all agree to use the same language to describe the
subject. Given that the states have a choice under the limited
convention view as to what type of convention to apply for, one
might actually argue that they are unambiguously better off
under that view, since they can always choose to apply for an
unlimited convention. One might, then, reach the further
conclusion that the harm from the unlimited convention view to
the Framers’ purpose of allowing amendments to be enacted
without a congressional obstacle is small indeed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has re-examined the question of whether the
Constitution authorizes limited conventions. I have argued that
the Constitution’s original public meaning allows the state
legislatures to apply for a convention limited either to a subject
or to a specifically worded amendment, that Congress must then
respond to that application by calling for a limited convention,
and that the convention must then follow the limitations of that
call. The conclusions I have reached here do depart from those
of most of the commentators who discussed the issue in the
1960s and 1970s, as well as some since then. But as I have tried
to show, their conclusions were based on a mistaken understanding of the original meaning.
If my argument is correct, it shows that a significant
problem with the constitutional amendment process—that the
only method for enacting amendments, that does not require
Congress’s consent, does not work—is not primarily the fault of
the Constitution’s drafters and ratifers. Rather, it is the
responsibility of interpreters who have failed to follow the
original meaning. If the correct understanding of the original
meaning were widely accepted in the legal academy, that would
bring us one step closer to a workable noncongressional
amendment process. Taking the next step, however, would be
harder. It would involve generating a sufficiently strong
consensus among politicians, judges, and lawyers that limited
conventions are constitutional, so that state legislators would
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have the confidence that their application for a limited
convention would not result in a runaway convention.
Unfortunately, it is at present difficult to imagine getting to that
point, but stranger things have happened.

